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I. INTRODUCTION 
U.S. telecommunications policy has reached a crossroads. During the 1980s and 
1990s, regulations focused primarily on mandating access to the portions of the local 
telephone network that still represented a natural monopoly, a policy epitomized by the 
two great landmarks of modern telecommunications policy: the breakup of AT&T1 and 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.2 The basic policy approach was eventually 
extended to broadband networks as well3 and has been widely emulated by other 
 
*Professor of Law, Communication, and Computer & Information Science and Founding Director, Center for 
Technology, Innovation and Competition, University of Pennsylvania.  
 1. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United 
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).  
 2. For the unbundling provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, see 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) 
(2006). 
 3. See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
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countries.4 
At the prompting of the courts,5 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
began to retreat from this policy during the 2000s in favor of a more deregulatory course. 
In response to the growing levels of competition, the FCC took steps toward eliminating 
mandatory access requirements on both telephone and broadband networks.6 Once the 
2005 Brand X decision effectively signaled the Supreme Court’s accession to this 
deregulatory trend,7 the FCC eliminated all access requirements on telephone and 
broadband systems alike.8 
The inauguration of a new administration has caused policymakers to consider once 
again whether to begin mandating access to broadband networks, as evinced by the 
continuing controversy surrounding the policy initiative known as network neutrality.9 
This Article reviews the arguments on both sides of this debate. Part II examines the case 
for regulation, focusing on the rationales and critiques surrounding three separate 
regulatory approaches: mandating access to local telephone networks, local loop 
unbundling, and promoting the ladder of investment. Part III lays out the case for 
deregulation. Part IV sets out the tradeoffs implicit in the choice between these two 
regulatory strategies. 
II. MANDATING ACCESS TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
This Part traces the origins of the policy of mandating access to telecommunications 
networks. The move to regulation takes place in three distinct phases. The first is 
mandating access to local telephone networks, exemplified by the regime imposed in the 
aftermath of the breakup of AT&T. The second is local loop unbundling, epitomized by 
the unbundled network element provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The 
third is a theory developed in Europe known as “the ladder of investment.” 
 
 
 4. See, e.g., Paul W.J. de Bijl & Martin Peitz, Local Loop Unbundling in Europe: Experience, Prospects 
and Policy Challenges, COMM. & STRATEGIES, 1st Qtr. 2005, at 33, 35–50, available at http://www.idate.fr/fic/ 
revue_telech/414/CS57_BIJL_PEITZ.pdf (reviewing the development of local loop unbundling in the European 
Union).  
 5. For the leading judicial decisions overturning unbundling with respect to telephony, see U.S. Telecom 
Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 586–87 (D.C. Cir. 2004); GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 422–24 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000). For judicial decisions overturning unbundling with respect to broadband, see U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. 
FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 428–29 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 6. See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
 7. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 8. See infra notes 116–21 and accompanying text. 
 9. Network neutrality has been one of the most hotly debated issues in telecommunications policy over 
the past several years. See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 1847, 1855–60 (2006) (providing an overview of the early debate on net neutrality). The FCC finally 
adopted an order implementing network neutrality through a system of ex post, case-by-case enforcement. 
Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905 (2010). Since then, parties have filed 
judicial challenges, and the House of Representatives voted to overturn the FCC’s action. Editorial, Net 
Neutrality Override, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2011, at A14. 
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A. First Generation Access: Mandating Access to Local Telephone Systems and Vertical 
Structural Separation 
Since at least the days of John Stuart Mill, one of the central problems usually seen 
as justifying rate regulation is natural monopoly.10 Natural monopoly occurs when a 
single firm can serve the entire market more cheaply than can two firms, a condition 
known as “subadditivity.”11 A sufficient condition for subadditivity is the existence of 
scale economies throughout the entire range of production, such as occurs when fixed 
costs are very high. These scale economies permit the firm with the largest volume to 
face the lowest costs, which in turn permits that firm to underprice all of its rivals. The 
resulting transfer of sales volume to the market-leading firm causes its cost and price 
advantage to widen still farther until it is the only firm remaining in the industry. Thus 
large scale economies can cause markets that begin with multiple producers to inevitably 
collapse into monopoly.12 
Throughout most of the history of the telephone industry, the fact that telephone 
service required large fixed costs led most observers to believe that the entire telephone 
system was a single, fully integrated, natural monopoly.13 During the 1960s, however, 
policymakers began to question this premise. For example, technological developments 
like telephone handsets, fax machines, and answering machines employed by end users, 
known as customer premises equipment (CPE),14 were nothing more than small 
appliances that could be manufactured efficiently at fairly low volumes. In addition, the 
advent of microwave transmission, pioneered by a company known as Microwave 
Communications, Inc., (later better known by its initials, MCI) allowed providers to offer 
long distance service without having to spend the large fixed costs needed to establish 
large networks of wires.15 Lastly, firms began to offer innovative new services that 
combined data processing with traditional transmission. These precursors to the modern 
Internet, called first “enhanced services” and later “information services,”16 also did not 
evolve the large fixed costs associated with natural monopoly.17  
As these other portions of the telephone network became potentially competitive, 
 
 10. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 132–54 (John W. Parker ed. 1849). 
 11. See William J. Baumol, On the Proper Cost Tests for Natural Monopoly in a Multiproduct Industry, 
67 AM. ECON. REV. 809, 810 (1977). 
 12. See DANIEL F. SPULBER & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, NETWORKS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ECONOMICS 
AND LAW 119–20 (2009). 
 13. See, e.g., GERALD R. FAULHABER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TURMOIL 107 (1987) (“Indeed, until the 
late 1960s few questioned that the telephone industry was a natural monopoly.”); PETER W. HUBER ET AL., 
FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 2.1.2, at 86 (2d ed. 1999) (“Is the telephone industry (or any part of it) 
a natural monopoly? Until the 1960s, the answer was generally presumed to be yes, from end to end.”); see also 
3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 787c, at 366 (3d ed. 2008) (“Until the 
1960s or 1970s long distance telephone connections between local exchanges in the United States were 
considered as much a natural monopoly as the local exchanges themselves . . . .”). 
 14. CPE contrasts with “telecommunications equipment,” which consists of the switches and wires located 
in the heart of the network that the telephone company uses to provide service. See Daniel F. Spulber & 
Christopher S. Yoo, Toward a Unified Theory of Access to Local Telephone Networks, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 43, 
44, 44 n.3 (2008). 
 15. SPULBER & YOO, supra note 12, at 235. 
 16. Id. at 236. 
 17. See Glen O. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&T and the Changing World of 
Telecommunications, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 517, 520–29 (1988) (reviewing FAULHABER, supra note 13). 
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local telephone service remained characterized by the high fixed costs associated with 
natural monopoly.18 Policymakers became concerned that the continued existence of 
monopoly over local telephone service would allow the Bell System to prevent the 
emergence of competition in these other areas of the network.19 One concern was that 
local telephone companies could use supracompetitive returns earned in local telephone 
markets to cross subsidize their own proprietary CPE, long distance, and information 
services.20 Another was that local telephone companies would use exclusivity or tying 
arrangements to foreclose competitive providers of those complementary services.21 Yet 
another worry was that the Bell System could avoid rate regulation of local telephone 
services by bundling them with unregulated services and charging prices for those 
unregulated services that would allow it to earn the supracompetitive returns denied to 
them by rate regulation of local services.22 
The historic solution was to segregate those portions of the telephone system that 
still exhibited natural monopoly characteristics (in this case, local telephone service) from 
those complementary services that are potentially competitive, and to require that the 
local telephone provider make its network available to all providers of complementary 
services on an equal basis.23 Most dramatically, the court order breaking up AT&T 
required that the Bell System spin off its local telephone and CPE manufacturing 
operations into independent companies, mandated that the newly created local telephone 
companies provide equal access to all providers of complementary services, and forbade 
these newly created local telephone companies from providing long distance, CPE, or 
information services.24 The decision was anticipated by both the FCC’s 1968 Carterfone 
decision, which eventually led to regulations requiring the Bell System to open its 
network to CPE manufactured by competitive providers,25 and the FCC’s Computer 
Inquiries, which required that large carriers who wished to offer enhanced services do so 
through a separate subsidiary while offering unaffiliated enhanced service providers 
nondiscriminatory access to their transmission facilities.26  
 
 18. See, e.g., 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 127 
(1971) (“That the provision of local telephone service is a natural monopoly is generally conceded.”); STEPHEN 
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 291 (1982) (“Local telephone service seems to be generally accepted 
as a natural monopoly.”). 
 19. SPULBER & YOO, supra note 12, at 236–37. 
 20. Id. at 130–31; Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United 
States v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 328, 338 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 2d 
ed. 1994); Robinson, supra note 17, at 528. 
 21. Noll & Owen, supra note 20, at 339–42; Robinson, supra note 17, at 528; see also SPULBER & YOO, 
supra note 12, at 236 (“Policymakers soon became concerned that the incumbent local telephone companies 
would be able to use their monopoly control over the local telephone network to favor their own proprietary 
enhanced and information service offerings.”). 
 22. SPULBER & YOO, supra note 12, at 145. 
 23. Id. at 131–32; Gerald R. Faulhaber, Policy-Induced Competition: The Telecommunications 
Experiments, 15 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 73, 82–84 (2003); Robinson, supra note 17, at 529. 
 24. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom Maryland v. United 
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
 25. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, Decision, 13 F.C.C. 2d 420 (1968). 
 26. The initial rules were based on a distinction between communications and data processing. Regulatory 
and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and 
Facilities, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C. 2d 291 (1970). The FCC later based the rules on the distinction 
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Requiring potentially competitive and inherently monopolistic lines of business to 
be structurally separated into distinct corporate entities made it more difficult for 
enterprises to use profits from their monopoly businesses to cross subsidize business units 
that faced competition.27 Structural separation also made discrimination against 
unaffiliated providers of complementary services easier to police. Regulators could 
simply insist that local telephone companies offer to competitors the same terms of 
interconnection that it provided to its own affiliated complementary services.28 If 
properly implemented, this approach would allow consumers to enjoy the benefits of 
relying on competition instead of direct governmental intervention to discipline industry 
actors, while still protecting consumers against potential anticompetitive abuses in those 
portions of the industry that remained uncompetitive. 
1. The Inevitability of Rate Regulation 
This solution did come at a cost. Compelling access to a bottleneck facility to 
promote competition in complementary services is generally regarded as being based on 
what lower courts have called the “essential facility doctrine.”29 Indeed, the doctrine 
formed the explicit basis for the breakup of AT&T.30  
Leading commentators have noted that the central concern of the essential facility 
doctrine is vertical integration, specifically that an enterprise that controls a monopoly 
input may be able to harm a vertically related market by refusing to share it.31 Indeed, 
courts and agencies ordering access to local telephone systems and commentators calling 
for access to last-mile broadband facilities acknowledge that their claims are 
fundamentally complaints about vertical integration.32 
The essential facility doctrine has been subject to extensive and trenchant critique.33 
As an initial matter, the doctrine requires direct regulation of rates. Although some have 
suggested that these problems can be avoided simply by imposing a nondiscrimination 
mandate,34 such a mandate would not prevent a vertically integrated monopolist from 
simply charging both its own affiliate and competitors interconnection fees that are 
prohibitively expensive. Doing so would not affect the monopolist’s bottom line, since 
 
between basic and enhanced services. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and 
Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C. 2d 384 (1980) [hereinafter Computer II Final Decision]. See 
generally Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communication Commission’s Computer Inquiries, 55 
FED. COMM. L.J. 167 (2003) (reviewing the history of the Computer Inquiries). 
 27. SPULBER & YOO, supra note 12, at 130. 
 28. Id. at 131. 
 29. The seminal decision is Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For an 
overview and critique of the doctrine, see Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to 
Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1826–64 (2007). 
 30. See United States v. AT&T Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1352–53, 1360–61 (D.D.C. 1981). 
 31. 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ¶ 771a, at 192–94; Bruce M. Owen, Determining Optimal 
Access to Regulated Essential Facilities, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 887, 887–89 (1989); Gregory J. Werden, The Law 
and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433, 462 (1987). 
 32. See AT&T, 524 F. Supp. at 1373–74; Computer II Final Decision, supra note 26, at 461; LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 165–66 (2001); TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH 295, 305–06, 311 (2010). 
 33. SPULBER & YOO, supra note 12, at 288–98. 
 34. See, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871 (2009); Thomas B. 
Nachbar, The Public Network, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 67 (2008). 
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any losses incurred by the complementary services division would be offset dollar-for-
dollar by higher profits earned by its local telephone operations. It would, however, 
effectively lock out competitors. In the absence of some control of rates, compelling 
access simply requires that the monopolist share the essential facility with its competitors 
without providing any benefits to consumers.35 If rates are not regulated, one would 
expect the monopolist simply to share the facility with everyone willing to pay the 
monopoly price.  
Compelling access to a monopoly facility thus requires rate regulation in order to be 
effective.36 Such access will engender incessant complaints about the rate being charged. 
As Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp have noted, once access is ordered,  
[t]he plaintiff is likely to claim that the defendant’s price for access to an 
essential facility (1) is so high as to be the equivalent of a continued refusal to 
deal, or (2) is unreasonable, or (3) creates a “price squeeze” in that the 
defendant charges so much for access and so little for the product it sells in 
competition with the plaintiff that the latter cannot earn a reasonable profit.37 
Policymakers have struggled to develop a principled basis for evaluating the 
reasonableness of rates.38 Rate regulation has long raised difficult questions of valuation 
and allocation of joint costs.39 The classic ratemaking methodology also provides 
insufficient incentive to reduce costs and encourages firms to use capital costs over 
operating costs even when doing so is inefficient.40 It raises difficult questions about the 
proper rate of return and whether returns should be based on assets’ historical cost or 
replacement cost.41 Lastly, it subjects economic pricing to the delays and biases inherent 
in the regulatory process.42 The Supreme Court has thus recognized that determining 
what constitutes a reasonable rate has proven to be an “embarrassing question”43 as well 
as a “laborious and baffling task.”44 
Moreover, disputes over the reasonableness of rates are especially difficult to 
resolve when the good subject to rate regulation varies in quality, as is the case with 
 
 35. 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ¶ 771b, at 195; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: 
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 208 (1976). 
 36. Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON 
REG. 171, 244–45 (2002). 
 37. 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ¶ 774e, at 276.  
 38. See National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, NTIA 
Regulatory Alternatives Report 13–31 (1987), available at http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/pub/ntia-rpt/87-222/87-
222.pdf (reviewing the problems associated with rate regulation). For other useful discussions, see, e.g., JAMES 
C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 547–622 (2d ed. 1988); ALFRED E. KAHN, THE 
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 27–54 (1988); KAHN, supra note 18, at 47–94, 
345–47; W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 364–74 (3d ed. 2000); George J. 
Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate?: The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1962). 
 39. SPULBER & YOO, supra note 12, at 66, 130–31. 
 40. Id. at 129. 
 41. Id. at 127–29. 
 42. Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 65 (2005). 
 43. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898). 
 44. Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 292 (1923) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
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broadband, in which quality of service varies along as many as four dimensions.45 When 
quality varies, the regulated firm can evade the effect of rate regulation simply by 
degrading quality.46 Indeed, this is just what occurred during prior attempts to subject the 
cable industry to rate regulation, where regulation failed to lower quality-adjusted cable 
rates.47  
2. The Inability to Realize Efficiencies of Vertical Integration 
In addition, mandating structural separation and equal access necessarily limits 
firms’ ability to enjoy the benefits of vertical integration. Although the law and scholarly 
commentary were once quite hostile toward the practice, vertical integration is now 
widely recognized as giving rise to substantial efficiencies.48 Some efficiencies are 
technological.49 Consider caller ID and voice mail, which have become increasingly 
popular features in telephone systems. As it turned out, the most efficient way to provide 
these services was through the switch already used to route the call, which was 
essentially a small computer that already had the capability and the information to 
perform these functions.50  
Other efficiencies are more price theoretic. For example, economists have long 
recognized that two successive monopolists in a single chain of production may both try 
to charge the entire monopoly markup, which can lead to higher prices than if those two 
monopolists merged through vertical integration.51 Similarly, vertical integration can 
enhance economic welfare when a monopolist controls an input that can be combined 
with other inputs in variable proportions. Charging a supracompetitive price for the 
monopoly input causes producing firms to substitute other inputs. On the one hand, this 
input substitution benefits consumers by limiting the monopolist’s ability to capture 
supracompetitive returns. On the other hand, it simultaneously harms consumers by 
producing the goods using a mixture of inputs that is suboptimal. Whether this causes 
economic welfare to increase or decrease depends on which of these two effects 
dominates.52  
 
 45. Broadband quality of service can vary in terms of bandwidth, delay, jitter, and reliability. See 
ANDREW TANENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS § 5.4 (4th ed. 2003). 
 46. See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 54–55 (2000). 
 47. See generally THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CABLE 
TELEVISION 2, 9, 43–44, 54, 95–99, 135, 208–10, 216 (1997); Gregory S. Crawford, The Impact of the 
Household Demand and Welfare, 31 RAND J. ECON. 422, 428, 444 (2000). 
 48. See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. 
ON REG. 171, 189–96 (2002) (reviewing the efficiencies that vertical integration can create). For more extensive 
discussions, see ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
AND CONTROL 18–23, 31–42, 48–52 (1983); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE 
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 519–27, 551–55 (3d ed. 1990); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 174–81 (1988); Bruce M. Owen, Antitrust and Vertical Integration in “New Economy” 
Industries, 38 REV. INDUS. ORG. 363, 370–75 (2011). 
 49. Martin K. Perry, Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 183, 187 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989). 
 50. SPULBER & YOO, supra note 12, at 236. 
 51. For the seminal statements, see Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. 
POL. ECON. 347 (1950); and Fritz Machlup & Martha Taber, Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and 
Vertical Integration, 27 ECONOMICA 101 (1960).  
 52. For the seminal economic analyses, see L.W. McKenzie, Ideal Output and the Interdependence of 
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Finally, as Oliver Williamson recognized in the seminal work for which he was 
recently awarded the Nobel Prize, vertical integration can also benefit consumers by 
eliminating the transaction costs needed to guard against opportunistic behavior.53 For 
example, when firms must make relationship-specific investments, they become 
vulnerable to opportunistic behavior, such as being held up. If the transaction costs 
needed to negotiate a contract protecting the parties against this problem become 
sufficiently large, the firms find it preferable to use vertical integration to eliminate the 
incentive for one level of production to appropriate surplus at the expense of the other.54 
Although a literature has emerged identifying circumstances under which firms have 
substantial incentive to engage in vertical integration, the models on which these studies 
are based tend to be very stylized and depend on restrictive assumptions.55 This in turn 
causes the results to be rather fragile and to tend to collapse whenever any of the models’ 
assumptions are relaxed. Just as importantly, even when vertical integration is feasible 
and profitable, the welfare implications of these cases are typically ambiguous.56  
The theoretical models showing that vertical integration tends to be welfare 
enhancing are backed by a substantial empirical literature confirming that vertical 
integration tends to benefit consumers in the vast majority of cases. One leading study 
focuses on voice messaging services, such as voice mail, which were made impossible by 
the line of business restrictions imposed during the breakup of AT&T and by Computer 
II. By requiring that such services would be provided by third parties, the FCC delayed 
the introduction of such services for ten years with an annual reduction of consumer 
welfare of over $1 billion.57  
The broader empirical literature on vertical integration leads to similar conclusions. 
For example, Francine Lafontaine and Margaret Slade conducted a comprehensive 
review of the empirical literature on vertical integration. Although they did not have any 
particular conclusion in mind when they began their review of the evidence, they were 
somewhat surprised to find that aside from a few isolated studies, the weight of the 
evidence indicated that “under most circumstances, profit-maximizing vertical-
integration decisions are efficient, not just from firms’ but also from the consumers’ 
points of view.”58 The survey concluded that “faced with a vertical arrangement, the 
burden of evidence should be placed on competition authorities to demonstrate that that 
 
Firms, 61 ECON. J. 785 (1951); Meyer Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 62 (1960); 
and John M. Vernon & Daniel A. Graham, Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration, 79 J. POL. 
ECON. 924 (1971).  
 53. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS & HIERARCHIES (1975).  
 54. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 89–94 (1985); Benjamin 
Klein Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive 
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 302–04 (1978). 
 55. See James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. 
ORG. 639, 643–44, 646–47 (2005); Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Critique and Review, 2001 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257, 278–79, 326. 
 56. See, e.g., Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. ECON. 345, 349–50 
(1988); Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837, 855–56 (1990). 
 57. Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in Telecommunications, in 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1, 3, 10, 14–15 (Clifford Winston et al. eds., 
1997). 
 58. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. 
ECON. LIT. 629, 680 (2007). 
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arrangement is harmful before the practice is attacked.”59 Moreover, the survey found 
“clear evidence that restrictions on vertical integration that are imposed . . . on owners of 
retail networks are usually detrimental to consumers.”60 They thus called on 
“government agencies to reconsider the validity of such restrictions.”61 A recent survey 
of the literature by leading vertical integration theorist and former FCC Chief Economist 
Michael Riordan similarly concludes, “A general presumption that vertical integration is 
pro-competitive is warranted by a substantial economics literature identifying efficiency 
benefits of vertical integration, including empirical studies demonstrating positive effects 
of vertical integration in various industries.”62 
Lafontaine and Slade’s separate review of the empirical literature on vertical 
contractual restraints drew similar conclusions. As a general matter, “privately imposed 
vertical restraints benefit consumers or at least do not harm them.”63 In contrast, 
government mandates or prohibitions of vertical restraints “systematically reduce 
consumer welfare or at least do not improve it.”64 The authors conclude that “the 
empirical evidence suggests that in fact a relaxed antitrust attitude towards [vertical] 
restraints may well be warranted.”65 Again, this conclusion came as something of a 
surprise: Lafontaine and Slade found the empirical evidence to be “quite striking,” 
“surprisingly consistent,” “consistent and convincing,” and even “compelling.”66  
A similar review of the empirical literature on vertical restraints conducted by four 
members of the Federal Trade Commission’s senior staff similarly found “a paucity of 
support for the proposition that vertical restraints/vertical integration are likely to harm 
consumers.”67 Only one study unambiguously found that vertical integration harmed 
consumers, and in that study the welfare losses were “miniscule.”68 On the other hand, “a 
far greater number of studies found that the use of vertical restraints in the particular 
context studied improved welfare unambiguously.”69 The survey thus concluded, “Most 
studies find evidence that vertical restraints/vertical integration are pro-competitive.”70 
The weight of the evidence thus “suggests that vertical restraints are likely to be benign 
or welfare enhancing,”71 which in turn provides empirical support for placing the burden 
on those opposing the practice.72 
The theoretical and empirical literature on vertical integration thus both strongly 
suggest that regulatory regimes mandating structural separation and prohibiting vertical 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Michael H. Riordan, Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST 
ECONOMICS 145, 169 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008). 
 63. See, e.g., Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: 
Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 392, 408 (Paolo Buccirossi 
ed., 2008). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 409. 
 67. Cooper, supra note 55, at 648. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 658. 
 71. Id. at 662. 
 72. Cooper, supra note 55, at 661–62. 
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integration imposes substantial consumer harm. The loss of these welfare benefits 
represents another way in which compelling access can harm consumers. 
B. Second Generation Access: Local Loop Unbundling 
The growing recognition that the bar to vertical integration implicit in structural 
separation was preventing the realization of important efficiencies led the FCC to explore 
ways that firms could provide both types of services on an integrated basis while still 
guarding against potentially anticompetitive activity.73 As a result, the FCC’s third 
Computer Inquiry amended the rules to allow major local telephone companies to provide 
information services on a vertically integrated basis so long as they gave other 
information service providers equal access to every element of their local telephone 
networks on an unbundled basis.74 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 similarly 
required all incumbent local telephone companies to provide unbundled access to all of 
their network elements at any technically feasible point.75 The unbundling requirement 
imposed by the 1996 Act did include one key limitation. It required the FCC to determine 
whether access to those elements was “necessary” and whether the failure to provide 
access to those elements would “impair” the requesting carrier’s ability to provide the 
services that it seeks to offer.76 The key network element was the wire connecting 
customers’ premises to the telephone company’s central office, known as the local loop. 
The FCC initially applied unbundling to a wide range of elements associated with 
local telephone service.77 The FCC has also imposed a wide range of unbundling 
requirements on DSL networks, including local loops.78 Perhaps most importantly, the 
 
 73. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer 
Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C. 2d 958, 1002–11 ¶¶ 79–97 (1986). 
 74. This regime is known as “open network architecture” (ONA). Id. at 1063–66 ¶¶ 210–17. While ONA 
plans were being developed, major local telephone companies were governed by an interim regime known as 
“comparably efficient interconnection” (CEI). Id. at 1018–65 ¶¶ 111–218. The regime created by the Third 
Computer Inquiry was eventually overturned on judicial review. See California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 925–30 
(9th Cir. 1994) (overturning the regime); California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1230–39 (9th Cir. 1990) (same). 
The FCC rolled its reconsideration of both CEI and ONA into the broadband proceedings opened in 2002. 
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 3019, 3024 ¶ 8 (2002). 
 75. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (1996). 
 76. Id. § 251(d)(2)(A)–(B) (emphasis added).  
 77. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First 
Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499 (1996) [hereinafter Local Competition Order]. In its landmark 2003 
Triennial Review Order, the FCC declined to eliminate the unbundled access requirements on local telephone 
service, only to see that decision overturned on judicial review. Review of the Section 251 Unbundled 
Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 16,978, 17,237–38 ¶ 419, 17,239 ¶ 422, 17,263–64 ¶ 459, 17,265–86 
¶¶ 464–85(2003), modified, 18 FCC Rcd. 19,020 (2003), vacated in relevant part sub nom. U.S. Telecom Ass’n 
v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 586–87 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 78. When the FCC first confronted DSL, the Agency required that DSL services be governed by a tariff, 
which essentially subjected DSL to an access requirement. GTE Telephone Operating Cos., Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 22,466 (1998). The FCC had to address precisely which network elements 
should be subject to the 1996 Act’s UNE access requirements. Because the 1996 Act by its own terms applies 
only to elements used in telephone exchange service and exchange access, the initial order implementing the 
statute declined to subject packet switches to UNE access requirements. Local Competition Order, supra note 
77, at 15,713 ¶ 427. The FCC also ruled that collocation did not extend to equipment used to provide only 
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FCC’s Line Sharing Order mandated unbundled access to the high frequency portion of 
the local loop used to carry DSL so that competitors could provide services over the same 
loop without having to offer conventional telephone service in the lower frequencies.79  
The FCC was considerably more tentative in its regulatory approach to cable modem 
service. It postponed addressing the proper regulatory classification for cable modem 
service for several years before finally ruling that it was an interstate “information 
service” exempt from both the common carriage regime established under Title II to 
govern telecommunications services, the regulatory regime established by Title VI to 
govern cable television services, and the tariffing and unbundling requirements created 
by the Computer Inquiries. In so ruling, the agency noted that it previously “has applied 
these obligations only to traditional wireline services and facilities, and has never applied 
them to information services provided over cable facilities.”80 In addition, the FCC 
declined to impose the tariffing and unbundling requirements created by the Computer 
Inquiries to cable modem service.81 The Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in National 
Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services subsequently 
upheld the FCC’s decision.82 
1. Administrative Difficulties 
Local loop unbundling has been subjected to extensive criticism. As an initial 
matter, unbundling requires extensive rate regulation to prevent the local telephone 
company from rendering the regime a nullity simply by charging excessive prices.83 
Moreover, unbundling poses numerous administrative difficulties. Unlike the access 
to local telephone networks required following the breakup of AT&T, unbundling gives 
competitors access to portions of the local telephone companies’ networks rather than 
their entire networks. Unbundling thus requires networks to offer services at points in the 
middle of their networks where they have never before offered service. This in turn 
requires the local telephone company to create interfaces and put into place at those 
interfaces processes for provisioning, monitoring, and billing the services provided.84 
As a result, local loop unbundling is likely to be very difficult to administer. As 
 
enhanced services. However, it did extend to equipment supporting both conventional telephone and enhanced 
services if the equipment was necessary to provide conventional telephone service. Id. at 15,794–95 ¶¶ 580–81. 
The order did mandate UNE access to all loops connecting central offices to end users, including the loops used 
to provide DSL. Id. at 15,691–92 ¶¶ 380–82. The order also obligated incumbent local telephone companies to 
fulfill any requests to condition existing loops to make them DSL compatible. Id. A subsequent order confirmed 
that collocation included multifunction equipment that could be used to provide both voice and data services. 
See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, First Report and 
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd. 4761, 4776–79 ¶¶ 27–31 (1999) (presenting 
the described order). 
 79. See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Third 
Report and Order in CC Docket No. 98-147 and Fourth Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96–98, 14 FCC 
Rcd. 20,912 (1999) (presenting the line sharing order).  
 80. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory 
Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4820–39 ¶¶ 34–69 (2002).  
 81. Id. at 4825 ¶ 43–44. 
 82. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1001–03 (2005). 
 83. SPULBER & YOO, supra note 12, at 275, 332, 369. 
 84. Id. at 182–84. 
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Justice Breyer warned in his separate opinion in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 
“[e]ven the simplest kind of compelled sharing . . . means that someone must oversee the 
terms and conditions of that sharing” which in turn can give rise to “significant 
administrative and social costs.”85 Indeed, 
The more complex the facilities, the more central their relation to the firm’s 
managerial responsibilities, the more extensive the sharing demanded, the more 
likely these costs will become serious. . . . And the more serious they become, 
the more likely they will offset any economic or competitive gain that a sharing 
requirement might otherwise provide.86 
Thus, “[r]ules that force firms to share every resource or element of a business would 
create not competition, but pervasive regulation, for the regulators, not the marketplace, 
would set the relevant terms.”87 Justice Breyer reiterated these concerns in Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. FCC, adding the observation that unbundling produces only a 
thin form of competition that instead of stimulating entry by competitors, focuses on 
“widespread sharing of entire incumbent systems under regulatory supervision—a result 
very different from the competitive market that the statute seeks to create.”88 
A majority of the Supreme Court expanded on these concerns in its 2004 decision in 
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, in which the Court 
noted, “[e]nforced sharing . . . requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, 
identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing.”89 Furthermore, 
because unbundled access affects network elements “deep within the bowels” of a local 
telephone network, they can only be made available if “[n]ew systems [are] designed and 
implemented simply to make that access possible.”90 Additionally, requests for 
unbundled access “are difficult for antitrust courts to evaluate, not only because they are 
highly technical, but also because they are likely to be extremely numerous, given the 
incessant, complex, and constantly changing interaction of competitive and incumbent 
LECs implementing the sharing and interconnection obligations.”91  
As a result, the essential facility doctrine necessarily requires the government to 
oversee the entire business relationship.92 The difficulties the FCC confronted when 
attempting to implement other access regimes, such as long-distance interconnection93 
and leased access to cable television systems94 provide further demonstration of these 
 
 85. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 86. Id. at 429 (citation omitted). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See supra notes 33–37, infra note 92, and accompanying text. 
 89. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004). 
 90. Id. at 410. 
 91. Id. at 414. 
 92. Id. at 414. 
 93. See MCI Commc’ns v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1131–32 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. AT&T 
Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 188, 189–90, 190 n.238 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom Maryland v. U.S., 460 U.S. 
1001 (1983); HUBER ET AL., supra note 13, at 136–40; Faulhaber, supra note 23, at 77, 81, 81–83 . 
 94. See S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 30–32 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1163–65; H.R. REP. 
NO. 102-628, at 39–40 (1992); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 968–70 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Donna 
M. Lampert, Cable Television: Does Leased Access Mean Least Access?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 245, 266, n.122, 
266–67 (1992). 
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problems. It is particularly telling that two distinguished scholars of network industries 
who are not particularly noted for deregulatory views have suggested that access regimes 
have proven so unworkable that they should be abandoned.95  
2. The Impact on Investment Incentives 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of local loop unbundling is the manner in 
which it reduces incentives to invest in alternative network capacity that would compete 
with the monopoly facility. One reason is that, as the well known “tragedy of the 
commons” demonstrates, people tend to overuse and underinvest in resources that are 
shared.96 Even more importantly, as Areeda and Hovenkamp note, “the right to share a 
monopoly discourages firms from developing their own alternative inputs.”97 Justice 
Breyer expressed the same concern in his separate opinion in Iowa Utilities Board: 
[A] sharing requirement may diminish the original owner’s incentive to keep 
up or to improve the property by depriving the owner of the fruits of value-
creating investment, research, or labor . . . . Nor can one guarantee that firms 
will undertake the investment necessary to produce complex technological 
innovations knowing that any competitive advantage deriving from those 
innovations will be dissipated by the sharing requirement.98  
In Trinko, a majority of the Supreme Court agreed, noting that “[c]ompelling such 
firms to share the source of their advantage . . . may lessen the incentive for the 
monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities.”99 In 
other words, without access, those firms would have to invest in alternative sources of 
supply. By rescuing those firms from having to undertake those investments, compelling 
access threatens to entrench the monopolist. Indeed, the imposition of rate regulation 
eliminates the supracompetitive returns that spur competitive investment in the first 
place. 
This underscores the extent to which mandating access to a bottleneck facility 
represents surrender to the bottleneck. Compelling firms to share their networks might be 
appropriate if entry by a competitor to the bottleneck were infeasible. In that event, any 
dampening of incentives to invest in alternative network capacity would be beside the 
point, because such entry would not be forthcoming.100 Indeed, that was the case with the 
breakup of AT&T, where local telephone service was still regarded as an intractable 
 
 95. See Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in Telecommunications, 
Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1999). 
 96. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244–45 (1968); see also Harold 
Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1970). 
 97. 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ¶ 771b, at 195–96; see also id. ¶ 773a(10), at 239–40 
(“[F]orcing a defendant to share an input can actually impair competition to the extent that it reduces the 
plaintiff’s incentive to supply that input for itself.”); id. ¶ 774c, at 266 (noting that sharing causes the parties 
seeking access “to lose some or all of the incentive to produce an alternative to the input on their own”). 
 98. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428–29 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citation omitted); accord Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 550–51 (2002) 
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that compelling incumbents to share the cost-
reducing benefits of a successful innovation destroys the incumbent’s incentives to innovate in the first place). 
 99. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407–08 (2004). 
 100. 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, ¶ 774c, at 266. 
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natural monopoly.101 As a result, there seemed little point in trying to promote entry by 
new local telephone facilities competing directly with the incumbent, and it was 
appropriate for policymakers to focus their attention on the secondary goal of promoting 
competition in complementary services.  
The situation is quite different, however, when competitive entry is feasible. When 
that is the case, competition policy should focus on stimulating the investments needed to 
dissipate the monopoly. The problem is that continued imposition in unbundling 
requirements will deter investment in alternative network capacity. Indeed, a growing 
body of empirical work has failed to confirm that unbundling has promoted investments 
in competitive local telephone services.102 Indeed, many studies indicate that access 
actively discouraged such investments.103 Even more importantly, studies have drawn 
similar conclusions about the impact that mandating access has had no significant effect 
or a negative effect on investments in last-mile broadband access services.104 At the same 
 
 101. See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 537 (D.D.C. 1987) (concluding that “[t]he 
exchange monopoly of the Regional Companies has continued because it is a natural monopoly”), aff’d, 894 
F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 535 U.S. at 475–76 (noting that at the time of the 
breakup of AT&T, local telephone service was “thought to be the root of natural monopoly in the 
telecommunications industry”); Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 14,171, 14,173–74 ¶ 4 (1996) 
(noting the breakup of AT&T continued to treat local telephone service as a natural monopoly). 
 102. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Rivalrous Telecommunications Networks With and Without Mandatory 
Sharing, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 477 (2006). For a recent survey, see Carlo Cambini & Yanyan Jiang, Broadband 
Investment and Regulation: A Literature Review, 33 TELECOMM. POL’Y 559, 569, 571 (2009). 
 103. See, e.g., Michael Grajek & Lars-Hendrik Röller, Regulation and Investment in Network Industries: 
Evidence from European Telecoms, 54 J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://www.esmt.org/fm/ 
479/ESMT-09-004.pdf; Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve Its 
Purpose? Empirical Evidence from Five Countries, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 173 (2005); Allan T. 
Ingraham & J. Gregory Sidak, Mandatory Unbundling, UNE-P, and the Cost of Equity: Does TELRIC Pricing 
Increase Risk for Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers?, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 389 (2003); Robert S. Pindyck, 
Mandatory Unbundling and Irreversible Investment in Telecom Networks, 6 REV. NETWORK ECON. 274 (2007), 
available at http://www.bepress.com/rne/vol6/iss3/2; Troy Quast, Did Federal Regulation Discourage 
Facilities-Based Entry into US Local Telecommunications Markets?, 32 TELECOMM. POL’Y 572 (2008); 
William P. Zarakas et al., Structural Stimulation of Facility Sharing: Unbundling Prices and Investment 
Strategy in Local Exchange Markets (Brattle Group July 15, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.brattle.com/_documents/UploadLibrary/Upload357.pdf; see also Hans Friederiszick et al., 
Analyzing the Relationship Between Regulation and Investment in the Telecom Sector (European Sch. of Mgmt. 
& Tech. White Paper No. WP-108-01, 2008), available at www.esmt.org/fm/479/WP-108-01.pdf (concluding 
that access regulation reduces the investment incentives for new fixed-line entrants, and has no effect on 
investment incentives for incumbents or mobile operators). For articles drawing the related conclusion that 
setting access prices too low deters investment, see Robert W. Crandall et al., Do Unbundling Policies 
Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based Investment?, 4 TOPICS IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 14 (2004), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/vol4/iss1/art14/; Agustin J. Ros & Karl McDermott, Are Residential 
Local Exchange Prices Too Low?, in EXPANDING COMPETITION IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 149 (Michael A. 
Crew ed., 2000); James Zolnierek et al., An Empirical Examination of Entry Patterns in Local Telephone 
Markets, 19 J. REG. ECON. 143 (2001); James Eisner & Dale E. Lehman, Regulatory Behavior and Competitive 
Entry (2001) (unpublished manuscript presented at the 14th Annual Western Conference, Center for Research 
in Regulated Industries), available at http://www.aestudies.com/library/elpaper.pdf; Leonard Waverman et al., 
Access Regulation and Infrastructure Investment in the Telecommunications Sector: An Empirical 
Investigation, LECG (Sept. 2007), http://www.etno.be/portals/34/etno%20documents/lecg_final%20report.pdf.  
 104. For articles failing to find a statistically significant relationship between access to broadband networks 
and investment, see Inmaculada Cava-Ferreruela & Antonio Albau-Muñoz, Broadband Policy Assessment: A 
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time, empirical studies generally indicate that competition from new, facilities-based 
entrants is a more effective driver of broadband deployment and adoption.105 
 
Cross-National Empirical Analysis, 30 TELECOMM. POL’Y 445, 455 (2006); Sangwon Lee, Broadband 
Deployment in the United States: Examining the Impacts of Platform Competition, 8 INT’L J. ON MEDIA MGMT. 
173, 179 (2006); Scott Wallsten & Stephanie Hausladen, Net Neutrality, Unbundling, and their Effects on 
International Investment in Next-Generation Networks, 8 REV. NETWORK ECON. 90, 91–94 (2009), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/rne/vol8/iss1/6/; Johannes M. Bauer et al., Broadband Uptake in OECD Countries: 
Policy Lessons and Unexplained Patterns (Sept. 20, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available  
at http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~jmueller/its/conf/helsinki03/abstracts/papers/Bauer–Kim–Wildman–EITS.pdf; 
Glen Boyle et al., Catching Up in Broadband Regressions: Does Local Loop Unbundling Really Lead to 
Material Increases in OECD Broadband Uptake? (July 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1184339; Mario Denni & Harald Gruber, The Diffusion of Broadband 
Telecommunications: The Role of Competition, 68 COMM. & STRATEGIES 139 (2007); Walter Distaso et al., 
Platform Competition and Broadband Uptake: Theory and Empirical Evidence from the European Union (Sept. 
2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=518382; Marcelo Grosso, Determinants 
of Broadband Penetration in OECD Nations (2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://networkinsight.org/verve/_resources/GrossoM.pdf; Thomas Hazlett & Coleman Bazelon, Regulated 
Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks: A Stepping Stone to Facilities-Based Competition? 16–19 (Oct. 
4, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://mason.gmu.edu/~thazlett/pubs/Stepping%20Stone%20 
TPRC.10.04.05%20.pdf.  
  For articles finding that access to broadband networks has a negative impact on investment, see 
Bouckaert et al., Access Regulation, Competition, and Broadband Penetration: An International Study, 34 
TELECOMM. POL’Y 661, 669, 671 (2010); Denni & Gruber, supra, at 151, 153, 155; Bronwyn Howell, 
Infrastructure Regulation and the Demand for Broadband Services: Evidence from OECD Countries, 47 
COMM. & STRATEGIES 33, 39 (2002), available at http://www.idate.org/fic/revue_telech/327/C&S47_ 
HOWELL.pdf; Scott Wallsten & Stephanie Hausladen, Net Neutrality, Unbundling, and Their Effects on 
International Investment in Next-Generation Networks, 8 REV. NETWORK ECON. 90 (2009); Scott Wallsten, 
Whence Competition in Network Industries? Broadband and Unbundling Regulations in OECD Countries, 
TECH. POL’Y INST. (Dec. 2007), http://www.techpolicyinstitute.org/files/s8.pdf; see also Sangwon Lee & 
Seonmi Lee, An Empirical Study of Broadband Diffusion and Bandwidth Capacity in OECD Countries, 2 
COMM. & CONVERGENCE REV. 36, 46 (2010) (finding local loop unbundling to be negatively correlated with 
broadband diffusion at a statistically insignificant level). 
  A handful of studies find a positive relationship between unbundling and investment. See Martha 
Garcia-Murillo, International Broadband Deployment: The Impacts of Unbundling, 57 COMM. & STRATEGIES 
83, 96, 102 (2005); Sangwon Lee & Justin S. Brown, Examining Broadband Adoption Factors: An Empirical 
Analysis Between Countries, 10 INFO: J. POL’Y, REG. & STRATEGY FOR TELECOMM., INFO. & MEDIA 25, 34–35 
(2008); Grosso, supra, at 21. These studies have been critiqued for anomalies in their specifications (both in 
terms of anomalous results and important variables omitted) and for assuming that unbundling policies are 
exogenous instead of entertaining the possibility that regulators impose unbundling requirements in response to 
investments by incumbents. See Declaration of Robert W. Crandall, Evert M. Ehrlich and Jeffrey A. Eisenach 
Regarding the Berkman Center Study (NBP Public Notice 13), at 28–31, available at http:// 
www.naviganteconomics.com/docs/Crandall%20Ehrlich%20Eisenach%20Declaration%20FINAL.pdf; Interna-
tional Comparison and Consumer Survey Requirements in the Broadband Data Improvement Act, 25 FCC Rcd. 
11,963 (2010) (GN Docket No. 09-47). In addition, many of these studies focus on adoption rather than 
investment and fail to take into account the natural diffusion of technology over time. See Cambini & Jiang, 
supra note 102, at 569, 571; Crandall et al., supra, at 30; Lee & Brown, supra, at 34. Notably, one study applied 
bivariate correlations to find that competition and unbundling are positively correlated with broadband 
diffusion, but found that statistical significance disappeared in two of three multivariate regression 
specifications. See Garcia-Murillo, supra, at 102. 
 105. See Debra J. Aron & David E. Burnstein, Broadband Adoption in the United States: An Empirical 
Analysis, in DOWN TO THE WIRE: STUDIES IN THE DIFFUSION AND REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
TECHNOLOGIES (Allan L. Shampine ed., 2003); Bouckaert et al., supra note 104, at 669; Denni & Gruber, supra 
note 104, at 155; Distaso et al., supra note 104, at 102–03; Garcia-Murillo, supra note 104, at 101, 102; Howell, 
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C. Third Generation Access: The Ladder of Investment 
Later commentators, particularly those based in Europe, have developed a third 
justification for mandating access known as “the ladder of investment.”106 Unlike 
previous theories, the ladder of investment does not provide access to elements which 
regulators regard as natural monopolies and are thus inherently incapable of being 
rendered competitive.107 Instead, the ladder of investment theory provides access to those 
network elements that can be feasibly replicated. The hope is that by providing access to 
these elements, new entrants can enter more easily. Initially, they enter by reselling the 
incumbent’s services. Over time, they begin offering additional services until eventually 
they become a full-blown facilities-based competitor.108  
Under this approach, the role of the government is not to oversee access to portions 
of the network that are inherently uncompetitive. Instead, this approach calls for 
regulators to manage access to portions of the network that can feasibly be competitively 
provided, but that would be too burdensome for new entrants to provide completely for 
themselves. 
There is, however, an internal contradiction in this argument. As the Supreme Court 
has noted, “[t]he indispensable requirement for invoking the [essential facility] doctrine is 
the unavailability of access to the ‘essential facilities.’”109 It is for this reason that courts 
applying this doctrine insist that the facility cannot be obtained from other sources or 
self-provisioned independently or when the party can compete effectively without access 
to the facility.110 The logic of the essential facility doctrine fails when the facility is 
otherwise available. As the Seventh Circuit noted when rejecting a similar request by 
MCI for access to portions of AT&T’s long distance network while MCI had not yet 
extended its own network to some parts of the country, “[t]here was no sufficient 
explanation as to why MCI, on the one hand, was building its own network, and, on the 
other, was entitled to access in the interim to AT&T’s facilities.”111 Moreover, because 
mandating access discourages rivals from investing in new networks, unless carefully 
managed, such a regulatory regime could well have the perverse effect of forestalling 
competition from emerging at all. 
Any regulator attempting to manage competition in the manner called for by the 
ladder of investment must calibrate its intervention very carefully. Setting prices too high 
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causes access to be uneconomical, in which case the regulatory intervention will serve no 
purpose. Setting prices too low destroys incentives for competitors to invest in substitute 
resources. Not only must regulators set prices correctly; they must also credibly commit 
to eliminating this access over time. Otherwise competitors can be expected to rely on the 
regulatory regime indefinitely rather than building alternative network capacity of their 
own.112 
These considerations make ladder-of-investment regulation very difficult to 
implement. A substantial theoretical literature has arisen identifying the substantial 
problems with implementing this approach.113 Although some reports offered some 
preliminary observations suggesting the viability of the ladder-of-investment theory,114 
formal empirical analyses failed to corroborate these findings.115 
III. THE DEREGULATORY ALTERNATIVE 
As Europe was developing new theories to justify continuing to mandate access to 
telecommunications networks, the United States embarked on a more deregulatory path. 
For example, in 2002, the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s decision requiring line 
sharing.116 The FCC’s landmark 2003 Triennial Review Order eliminated unbundling 
requirements on most DSL-related network elements,117 and its attempt to retain 
unbundling requirements on local telephone service was overturned by the courts and 
subsequently eliminated.118 As noted earlier, the Supreme Court’s 2005 Brand X decision 
upheld the FCC’s 2002 decision exempting cable modem service from access 
regulation.119 Shortly thereafter, the FCC eliminated any remaining access requirements 
on DSL.120 The FCC has also issued rulings declaring that broadband over power line 
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and wireless broadband constitute information services.121  
A. The Emergence of Competition 
This deregulatory transformation in U.S. telecommunications policy was driven in 
no small part by the emergence of competition. With respect to telephony, incumbent 
local telephone companies face fierce competition from VoIP and wireless telephone 
providers.122 The number of wireline telephones has declined sharply, dropping from a 
high of 193 million in December 2000123 to a low of 122 million as of June 2010.124  
With respect to broadband, courts have held that the level of competition that 
already exists between DSL and cable modem systems is sufficient to undercut the 
justification for requiring last-mile providers to provide unbundled access to their 
competitors.125 The feasibility of competitive entry is further underscored by recent 
investments in fiber to the home (such as Verizon’s FiOS network) and 4G wireless 
technologies (such as WiMax and LTE).126 Although the scale economies inherent in 
telecommunications will necessarily prevent markets from being fully competitive, any 
regulatory regime must bear in mind that regulation is not costless. As a former FCC 
Chief Economist has pointed out, while unregulated monopoly performs sufficiently 
poorly to tip the balance in favor of incurring the costs of regulatory intervention, the fact 
that unregulated oligopoly performs substantially better tips the balance in favor of 
deregulation.127  
The emergence of competition effectively undercuts the case for continuing to 
mandate access to the existing network. In many cases, anyone who is denied service by 
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one provider should have sufficient options to obtain service from another provider. 
B. Impact on Investment Incentives 
The shift to deregulation may still be justified even if the market has not yet become 
sufficiently competitive. This is because granting access would make it far less likely that 
the competing network will ever be built. In short, the existence of an access requirement 
would rescue anyone needing access to the facility from having to undertake the risks of 
building a competing network. Denying access would provide the strongest incentives for 
creating the alternative network capacity. Although denying access would cause static 
efficiency losses in the short run, stimulating entry by a competitor would promote 
dynamic efficiency gains in the long run. 
For this reason, policymakers should refuse to impose an access regime whenever 
entry is feasible. The fact that competitive entry may take a long time and be quite 
expensive does not justify imposing access, because in short, late is better than never.128 
Approaches that dislodge bottlenecks by stimulating competitive entry rather than simply 
requiring that they be shared have the further advantage of having built-in exit strategies 
embedded within them. In contrast, by curtailing investment incentives, mandated 
sharing of a bottleneck facility implicitly presumes that the monopoly facility (and the 
regulatory regime overseeing how it will be shared) will persist indefinitely. Rather than 
committing to using behavioral regulation to engage in ongoing oversight indefinitely, 
deregulation promotes a structural solution that is less intrusive and requires much less 
ongoing supervision. 
The inevitable lag in adjusting regulation also raises the risk that regulations, such as 
access, that protect incumbents from new entry will continue to exist long after the 
justifications for enacting the regulation have long disappeared.129 At best, the inevitable 
lag in enacting new regulations will cause economic losses. At worst, by destroying 
incentives to build new technologies, regulation might cement the market concentration 
that represents the central focus of broadband policy into place.  
IV. DECIDING BETWEEN REGULATION AND DEREGULATION 
How, then, should policymakers determine the choice between deregulation and 
reregulation? The foregoing analysis suggests the following considerations. As an initial 
matter, policymakers should calibrate regulation to ensure that it applies only if 
competitive options do not exist in the market. If sufficient competitive alternatives exist, 
consumers are unlikely to be harmed by the refusal of any one provider to offer service. 
If sufficient competitive alternatives are not available, policymakers should ask 
whether competitive entry is feasible. If so, they should assess the likely short-run static 
efficiency losses incurred while waiting for entry to occur against the long-run dynamic 
efficiency gains.130 Although some scholars have categorically asserted that because the 
dynamic efficiency gains will be compounded over time, they will invariably dominate 
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the short-run static efficiency losses,131 whether the dynamic efficiency gains will 
dominate the static efficiency losses depends on the magnitude of the gains and losses, 
the speed of entry, and the appropriate discount rate, among other considerations. 
Determining the welfare implications of network diversity requires a multifaceted inquiry 
that is not susceptible to a simple policy inference. 
Finally, policymakers must take institutional considerations into account.132 The 
fact that the deregulation focuses on structural rather than behavioral relief increases its 
implementability. In addition, deregulation decentralizes decision making and minimizes 
the potential adverse impact of regulatory delay. In addition, any access regime must take 
into account the fact that regulatory agencies reflect public preferences only imperfectly 
and that agency decision making is frequently influenced by political goals and public 
interest pressures that are not always consistent with good policy.133 Policymakers may 
be susceptible to undervaluing the future benefits associated with the entry of alternative 
network capacity, which will no doubt seem uncertain and contingent, in favor of the 
immediate and concrete benefits of providing consumers with more choices in the here 
and now.134 Administrative agencies are also often thought to exhibit a tendency to 
enlarge their jurisdiction even when the proper response would be to contract it.135 
Consider, for example, the emergence of a technological alternative to a network that had 
previously been a natural monopoly. The proper policy response would be deregulation 
of the previously regulated industry, since the emergence of competition would vitiate the 
justification for regulation in the first place. An agency, however, has the incentive to do 
precisely the opposite. Rather than deregulate the old industry, all too often agencies 
respond by asserting jurisdiction over the new industry and extending the same restrictive 
legacy regulations applied to the old industry to the new industry. This is exactly what 
happened in the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) when the emergence of the 
trucking industry eliminated whatever natural monopoly power was enjoyed by the 
railroad. Rather than deregulating railroads, the ICC extended the regulatory regime 
governing railroads to the new competitor. A similar pattern emerged when cable 
television circumvented the supposed scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum that 
justified intrusive regulation of broadcasting.136 
The reaction is understandable. Agency personnel have every reason to be reluctant 
to eliminate the justification for their continued employment. In addition, they no doubt 
grow to identify with the regulatory regimes that they administer and are likely to resent 
and to try to control anything that disrupts them. But the emergence of competition in a 
previously uncompetitive industry is precisely the type of disruption that should be 
embraced. Giving regulatory authorities gatekeeper authority over network architecture 
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necessarily puts network policy in the crosshairs of this tension. 
If entry is impossible, policymakers should abandon the goal of trying to promote 
entry by new local telecommunications networks and instead focus on the secondary goal 
of promoting competition in complementary services through access regulation. In so 
doing, policymakers should include some mechanism for eliminating access mandates as 
soon as competition becomes feasible to make sure that regulation does not itself become 
the reason for the suppression of competition. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The decision whether to mandate access to telecommunications networks thus 
presents policymakers with a choice between two regulatory paradigms, one that focuses 
on breaking down the monopoly by stimulating competitive entry and another that 
surrenders to the monopoly and simply seeks to allocate the monopoly loop. The 
theoretical and empirical literature both suggest that whenever competition is feasible, 
policymakers should generally follow the first course by refusing to mandate access. 
When competition is feasible but not yet present, policymakers should mandate access 
only if the short-run static efficiency losses dominate the long-run dynamic efficiency 
gains. Only if competition is infeasible can a simple policy inference in favor of access 
regulation be sustained. Given the overall level of competition that already exists in these 
markets and the current pattern of entry by new technologies, it is likely that the scope of 
this justification is already small and will only become smaller in the years to come. 
 
